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THEATRE LOGISTIC PLANNING
A

lecture

delivered

by

Capt. Henry E. Eccles, USN
at

the Naval War College
March 28, 1950

I-INTRODUCTION
An understanding of theater logistic planning is bas�d on
the understanding of:
The nature and structure of Logistics; the art of command;
nature of war.
the
and
These subjects are all so intertwined that there is no ad
vantage in trying to decide which comes first, the hen or the egg.
Furthermore, we are not so· much concerned with the mani
fold details of planning and planning forms as we are with the
major elements, problems and relationships that confront the
theater commander in planning his logistics. So I shall disriiiss: d¢
tails and forms with the statement that planning forms are in a
process of development in all our major military colleges and many
important details of theater logistics are ably discussed in Chapter
VII of "Joint Overseas Operations". Rather than go into detail in
these matters let me take my cue from the 3rd Chapter of the
Second Epistle to the Corinthians where St. Paul says-"Not of the
letter but of the spirit. For the letter killeth but the spirit -giveth
life." Let us therefore try to develop the basic spirit· or philosophy
of theater logistics:
Captain Eccles is Head of the Logistics Department at the Naval
War College.
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II-DEFINITIONS.
First, a definition of Logistics:
"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the

conduct of military operations.

Logistics pro

vide the means therefor."
This broad and simple definition has the great advantage of
expressing a relationship between the three major elements of war.

Every problem in war contains these three elements in varying
degrees.

Perhaps it will help us to consider them as three inter-

secting rings.

(Illustration No. 1).

Logistics itself can be said to have three basic elements:

The Determination of Requirements; Procurement and
Distribution, and the aspects of Organization, Planning, Execution
and Supervision. These elements and aspects all enter into every
problem in logistics and they blend and overlap in manner and de

gree which varies greatly according to circumstances.

In general, logistic problems fall into the six broad categories

of Personnel, Supply, Maintenance, Medical, Transportation and

Base Development, or simplifying it greatly, Men, Material and
Services.
III-THE UNIFIED COMMAND
Theater Logistic Planning derives directly from the concepts
of Unified Command as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
If we study their directives we see that in effect the Joint Chiefs
have said,
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"In the future, theaters of war will be organized as
Unified Commands. In so far as practicable each service
will handle its own logistics under broad coordinating
policies established by the Unified Commander. But when
the Unified Commander sees the need for the consolida
tion of logistic activity he will tell us and we will order
it. Furthermore, the Unified Commander by reason of his
authority of review of requirements and recommendations
of priorities and programs, has the power to exercise direct
logistical control almost as he sees fit just so long as he
keeps out of operating detail.."
If we examine the proposed draft of "Joint Action Armed
Forces," Chapter III Section VII "Logistics (Wartime) ," we see
that the conferees who may have been at odds in many other in
stances, agree on the nature and degree of control the theater com
mander may exercise in war. Theater Commanders will have the au
thority to exercise a very high degree of control in that they are
specifically responsible for policy and coordination in distribution,
supply build-up, maintenance, salvage, base development, trans
portation, port operation, medical and dental service and military
government. Thus we have real unification in the theater of war.
IV-THE NATURE OF WAR
A few words on the nature of war as it affects theater
logistic planning. It is a truism to say that the only constant in
war is variation. War is the constant interplay of variables. In
general it is fought in accordance with campaign plans designed to
accomplish specific objectives, the selection of which is the task of
strategy. The campaign plan for the Central Pacific was originally
drafted in late 1943 and given the code name Granite. In its or4
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iginal form it contemplated five separate major amphibious opera
tions-Gilberts, Marshalls, Eniwetok, Truk and the Marianas. This
was amended in June 1944 to abandon Truk, and extend the offensive through Palaus, Mindinau, Luzon, and Formosa and Amoy on
the China Coast. While this campaign plan was not- followed pre
cisely, it nevertheless provided the foundation for the logistic sup
port of the actual operations we did undertake.
Campaigns are usually made up of a series of operations
which themselves may be either simple or complex, brief or pro
tracted, depending on the characteristics of the theater of war, the
capabilities of the opposing forces and other variables. All wars
. seem to have one common characteristic, i. e., they consist of long
periods of comparative inactivity interspered with short periods
of violent conflict. However, this period of comparative quiet is
actually the period of logistic build-up. The process may be likened
to the charging and discharge of an electrical condenser.
This is very well illustrated by a graph of cargo and person
nel shipped by the Army to overseas Atlantic areas in the last war.
(Illustration No. 2) Note particularly the expanding scale of activity
and the build-up before each operation.
Looking at this from a purely theoretical point of view we
may analyze the chart somewhat as follows: (Illustration No. 3)
A steady expansion of theater forces engaged in routine operations
such as patrols, reconnaissance and defensive actions, a progressive
build-up of supplies and equipment for a campaign, and special
build-up and measures for specific operations.
Actually, the build-up prior to each operation only partially
supported the operation it was intended for. In the Pacific we
found often that we were financing one operation with the ma
terial and men originally assembled for the previous one, but which
RESTRICTED
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-arrived opportunely enough to be of use in the base development of
the island just captured.
V-THE BASIC THEATER LOGISTIC PLAN

a:

The charts have shown steadily expanding logistic effort.
How do we coordinate this expansion and at the same time pro

vide for the efficient support of our day-to-day operations? Here we
come to the philosophic basis of theater logistic planning and again

I present a purely theoretical concept: A Basic Theater Logistic

Plan-a plan which in actual practice may very well be Paragraph
4 or the Logistic Annex of a conventional campaign plan. This
basic plan is the heart and soul of the day-to-day operations in a
theater of war and it provides the material build-up for the initia
tion of offensive operations.

Let us start in the center of the chart (Illustration No. 4)
and work out. Every basic theater logistic plan is built .on four
fundamental considerations.
First, . the characteristics of the
theater, its geography, topography and hydrography, its relative
distances and its distance from the continental U. S. Next we
have the - forces involved, then the nature of the operations con
templated and finally, the requirements for mutual or inter
theater support.
In the second circle we have six functional elements; Supply,
Maintenance, Medical, Personnel, Transportation and Base Devel�
opment. You may choose any functional elements you wish-those
shown here are merely representative groupings of the major ele
ments which seem to be common to all theatres.

The theatre commander examines each functional element in
the light of the inter-play of variables in the four fundamental con
siderations and reaches certain types of decisions, which are indi-

8
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cated in the outer ring.

The theater commander will decide to ex

ercise direct control of certain' elements.

delegate control to component commanders.

In other cases he will

In some instances he

will consolidate all of certain activities, in other cases he will merely

outline general policies.

A:nd finally in my opinion he wm · be wise

to ignore certain matters, particularly problems which may work

themselyes out if left alone.

The summation of these decisions becomes the basic theater

logistic plan.

If wisely developed this not only establishes the pro

cedures and policies governing the normal logistics of the theater
but it becomes sound standing operating procedure for the develop

ment of the logistics of specific operations.

On 31 October 1945 CINCPOA'S standing operating pro

cedures governing logistic support of theater forces filled 98 pages.

These were condensations and revisions of many times that volume
of directives which were in effect on V-J Day. By proper planning I

think they could have been boiled down to 20 to 30 pages.
VI-DETAILS OF THE BASIC PLAN

With this general background let us discuss some of the as

pects of this plan.
transportation.

First, consider the relation between supply and

In any war of the future, -American forces must

combine great firepower with great mobility.

It may well be that

an increase . in the efficiency and reliability of our transportation

and distribution system will permit us to lower our usual levels of
supply without danger to our combat forces.
increase mobility.

This would, of course,

In any event we must realize that any unnec

essarily high level of supply reduces mobility.

It is very probable that the theater commander will keep a

very close watch on his supplies of ammunition.

This is a very

10
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specialized field and with the increasing use of new types of guided
missiles and rockets, new problems in storage_ and distribution will
undoubtedly arise.
The very fact that an area petroleum officer is a member of

every theater commander's staff indicates that the theater com
mander actually controls the distribution of petroleum throughout
his command. In this connection it is well to remember that when

we operate major Naval task forces overseas, the oil requirements
are so great that any advanced base storage we can build ashore
is merely a. surge tank in the supply pipeline of fast tankers.

When we remember that one B-36 bombardment group will

burn up a million gallons of aviation gasoline on a single mission,

and that our fleet in its operations at Okinawa used twelve million

barrels of oil, the importance of close control of petroleum products

at the theater level should become very clear. This is especially so

since this tremendous bulk must be kept in motion ; it may be
slowed, or speeded up, but there is no way that any considerable part

may be set down to await prospective use. There just never is that

much storage capacity.

Furthermore any undue retention of fast

tankers to build up ready supplies will result in shortages months
later.

VII----TRANSPORTATION
In addition to its effect on levels of supply, the subject of

transportation raises some very interesting points.

From·time to

time the suggestion is made that ocean transportation will be con

trolled wholly from Washington.

While undoubtedly Washington.

must of necessity exercise a very important degree of control in

world shipping, still we must remember that the theater command

ers have the major combat operational responsibility and therefore

RESTRICTED
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must have commensurate logistical operational authority.

Actually

a compromise will probably be made but it should be based on recog
nition of many considerations.

The subject of transportation falls into two main categories;

operation and traffic management, and an understanding of the na
ture of these is important to all who deal with logistics.

Operation

•concerns itself primarily with the most efficient management of the

carrier, be it ail airplane, a truck or a ship. Traffic management is

concerned with the most efficient distribution of the material which

is being transported.

It is very important that these two aspects of transporta

tion be considered as separate and that their relative importance be

The proper goal of carrier operation is to serve
t
. he demands of traffic management.·
clearly understood.

In considering operation we must bear in mind that oceanic

shipping is world-wide and so cuts across all theaters of war and
that in wartime it involves commercially-manned as well as Navy

manned ships, that it is internationally owned and operated and

.. that it involves so-called strategic shipping and cargoes for the sup

port of allies and neutrals as well as the strictly military or op

. erational cargoes. However, a theater combat commander views his
transportation problem as a whole whereas the transportation op

eration agencies may tend to view their problems from the some

what narrower aspect of a shipping company, an airline or a truck
ing company or railroad.

When a theatre commander has this broad point of view he

may change th� emphasis of his concern from one means of trans
portation to another as varying needs of the combat situation de
mand, and make the necessary adjustments..

12
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If all transportation were to be controlled from Washington,
that responsiveness to immediate or vital local needs would tend to
become sluggish. On the other hand the theater commander must un
derstand the far-reaching effects of "retentions" on the whole ship
ping picture.
We may conclude therefore that the theater commander
must exercise a high degree of control of all transportation, that
the actual carrier operation be delegated, and that the theater com
mander reserve to hims�lf movement control and traffic manage
ment. The control of material flow is. best exercised by allocations
of cargo space to component commanders.

It goes �ithout saying

that the commander himself must understand the nature of the
problem.

In addition he requires the staff assistance of experts in

this important and highly specialized field.
In a very real sense we may think of transportation as the
mortar, or bond, that ties all parts of the theater logistic system
together.
in motion.

All over the theater, men and material are constantly
A bottleneck anywhere inevitably slows down traffic

all along the line, and a sudden closing of any valve may well rup
ture the pipeline.

An enormous amount of energy is lost in the

inertia of starting and stopping the flow, and it should be the
theater commander's objective to keep the flow of traffic as smooth
and continuous as his military operations will permit.
The general term maintenance covers a multitude of prob
lems.

In a theater in .which major naval forces are operating, it

includes ship maintenance, repair and salvage.

Normally of course

such matters are of primary concern to the Navy Component
Commander (Fleet Commander) who handles them through the
type and task force commanders. However, in such cases we fre
quently find that the theater commander is a Naval officer and in

RESTRICTED
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that case, so far, he has always worn two hats, theater and fleet, in

which case the theater commander is very much concerned with

such problems and his plans so indicate.

VIII-PLANNING FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION
Rather than dwell too long on the basic theater logistic
plan, let us pass to logistic planning for a specific operation. It is in

connection with these specific operations that we encounter two
terms that are frequently misused: "feasibility" and "calculated
risk". In some instal!ces it is considered that the logistics section
of a staff decides the logistic feasibility of a contemplated course

of action. This, of course, is not the case. The logistics section
assists the commander in determining feasibility by making a

logistic estimate or staff study. This estimate is a calculation of
the logistic requirements necessary to support the operation, and
a study of how logistic resources may best be employed to fulfill
these requirements. The summary includes statements of pros
pective deficiencies, with estimates as to how these deficiencies may
limit the freedom of action of the commander and recommendations

as to what can or should be done to overcome or compensate for

the prospective deficiencies. The commander then decides the logistic

feasibility of his course of action and he decides the risk involved,

balancing this calculated risk against the gains to be achieved. · I

know of no finer discussion of the calculated risk than that con

tained on page 34 of Fleet Admiral King's, "US Navy �t War
1941-1945.". Calculating risk is an exacting exercise of profess

ional judgment and the term should not be used loosely as a
blanket to cover the corpse of sloppy thinking.

Planning for an operation has the same general character

istics as basic planning in that it derives from, and must be cons.

14
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current with, strategic planning, and it is governed by the same
basic considerations, and results in similar types of decisions. · But
in ope;ational planning, most logistic tasks are delegated to task
force commanders with the component and type commanders acting
in support. However, the need for keeping the enemy off balance
requires that offensive operations be launched as rapidly as logistic
considerations permit. Since task force planning staffs cannot be
rapidly asssembled and then quickly start to plan effectively, it
is necessary. for th� theater commander to prepare many of the
plans that in theory .should be made by the task force commander.
There simply is no other staff which can do this work in time to
meet target dates.
The most practicable means of "beating" the vital factor of
lead time is by submitting long range forecasts. In World War II
CINCPOA issued staff studies and general planning directives
months in advance of his operational directives and this enabled -his
component and type commanders to calculate and submit material .
and personnel forecasts. This combination of staff study and pla�
ning directive also permitted concurrent strategic and logistic plan
ning at the operational level. Furthermore, even if the targets aiid
dates were shifted, the logistic support built up by the forecasts
usually fitted the new operation very well;
We should never forget the fact that operational logistics
actually acquire great and real physical momentum. Thousands
of tons of solid material are actually moving. While tinder favorable
conditions we can change the direction of the mass or somewhat
modify its composition, there are other conditions where all the
orders in the world have no effect. Recognition of lead time, fore
casting, decentralization of execution, etc., all contribute to the
flexibility we desire. Nevertheless we must understand that a
reasonably good plan that is understood and is feasible of accom-
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plishment is far superior to the "perfect plan" which is difficult to
understand and issued too late. So there always comes a time when
we must· say "This is

changes!"

I recommend

to
'

it-Let

well· enough

alone-No more

all of you the study of the' plans for the

· Olympic Operation, the invasion of Kyushu.

For while there was in

that operation a dangerous lack of clarity in command relations,
the plans reflected very valuable experience in logistic planning.
IX-GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Let me offer some thoughts as to certain principles which ap

ply to logistic planning at theater level.
as to the use of the word "principles".

But first a word of caution

Since we are only just be

ginning to develop logistic theory and principle we should not use

the word in its strictest sense but rather in a very broad sense as a

statement of something that we believe to be generally true.

First: The combat commander must have control of his own

logistic support.

The corollary to this is that he must be competent to and

prepared to exercise this control in harmony with the overall war

effort-that is to say, in accordance with the principles of mutual

support and unity of effort.

A further corollary is that he must

have a staff which is educated and organized to assist him to ex

ercise this authority. To illustrate the growth of such a staff let us
note the growth of the logistic section of Cincpoa's staff from Sep
tember 1943 to July 1945: (Illustration No. 5)

Second: As long as the supply of an itein or a "service" ex

ceeds the requirement for that item or servi�e, strict control is not
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necessary.

When, however, a shortage exists, then theater control

is called for.

I suggest three corollaries to this:
(a) The fewer the matters in which the theater com

mander finds it necessary to exercise his power of con

trol the better the logistic system and situation in: that
theater.

(b) A major task of the theatre logistics officer is to

look· ahead and anticipate shortages and the consequent
need for controls, before they occur.

(c) Any system of control of short items must be based

on allocations in order to be effective.

Priorities, except as

part of allocations, are ineffective and self-defeating.
Third:

The more detail that is put into any plan or order,

the shorter the period of time during which that plan can usefully

serve and the fewer the number of organizations that can be ef
fectively controlled.
Fourth:

The higher the authority promulgating on order,

the greater the time and effort required to milke a necessary change,

and the more serious the consequences of a mistake or error in
judgment.
Fifth:

Power and authority attract power and authority ··

.-They are magnetic.

When the Unification Act of 1947 was first framed this

tendency was clearly recognized.

The Staff of the Joint Chiefs

was limited to one hundred and the Secretary of Defense was pro

hibited from having a military staff.

18
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permitted a staff of two hundred and ten and the civilian employees
of the Secretary of Defense have increased greatly. Furthermore,
it would appear that many officers who are carried on the personnel
allowance lists of the military departments are actually spending
much of their time performing duty with other offices within the
Department of Defense.

I mention these matters 1 because I fear the magnetic effect

of power in that it will create a tendency in the Department of De
fense to encroach upon the prerogatives and functions of theater

commanders, and create principalities within the kingdom of the
commander.

X-EVALUATION OF LOGISTIC PLANS
Many of you will leave here to. assume major planning res
ponsibilities. I, therefore, suggest certain criteria which may be
useful in evaluating the logistic plans you may encounter.
But first a caution: We should always remember that any
particular logistic plan can be analyzed only on the basis of a full

knowledge of the strategic concepts and plans it is designed to sup
port and · of the background of the command organization in the
command itself. It is vital that all strategic and logistic planning
be in fact concurrent, and all strategic plans be kept within the.
limitations of our logistic capabilities.
When you are sure of these fundamentals you may then ask:
Are the theater command and the theater staff
structures both designed for war?
Is the theater Jtaff truly a joint staff?
Are the plans up to date?
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Do the plans provide for the · expansion and provision of

logistic resources and services prior to the expansion of
combat elements?

Are the plans within the limitations of our mobilization
capabilities?

Do the plans provide a maximum degree of central policy

control with decentralized execution and operation?

Are the responsibilities of the component and type com

manders clearly defined?

Do the plans place reliance on standing operating pro
cedures?

Are there . provisions for reporting and redistributing

excess stocks?

Do they provide for ready cross-servicing and use-of com

mon facilities?

Are there provisions for inter-theater mutual support?
If these questions can be answered yes, the chances are

that the plans and organizations will function well in war.

cases, however, beware of a superficial analysis.

In all

XI-CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me leave you with these thoughts; Theater

strategic and logistic planning are inseparable.

In addition to

growing concurrently with the strategic plans, the logistic plans "
are intimately related to the command organization.

A sound

theater staff organization is essential to the formulation of good
logistic plans and to their smooth execution.

20
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Theater logistic planning consists of two main parts: First,

the Basic Theater Logjstic Plan (Paragraph 4 or the logistic an
nex of a conventional Campaign Plan), and second, developing from
this, the Logistic Plan for a Specific Operation (Para 4 or the
Logistics Annex of the Operation Plan).

While good planning forms, factors and usage data are es

sential tools, they themselves do not constitute nor produce good
plans. Good plans are the product of the skilled professional

judgment of the planner.

And finally-Don't expect the plan you draw up in peace

time to be the plan you necessarily use in war.

Any peacetime

plan, when you do not have or exercise the initiative, is merely
the foundation and mental preparation for what you must do in
war.

And that mental preparation is more important than the

plan itself.

For only when the planning process, its major con

siderations, and the various relations of cause and effect are clear

ly understood, can our commanders make the rapid readjustments
that are required when the early course of the war follows the
enemy's plan rather than our plan.
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